Spring 2026 Colloquium Series
About
This series is jointly hosted by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science (MCPS), the Program in History of Science and Technology, and the Program in the History of Medicine. Each semester we invite scholars from around the country and the world to present on scholarship in the history and philosophy of science, technology and medicine.
Seminars will not be held on the following date(s):
- 3/6/26
- 3/13/26
Lectures begin at 3:35pm in 216 Pillsbury Drive (formerly Nicholson Hall), Room 125 on the East Bank of the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities campus.
At this time, all events will be in-person unless otherwise stated. Some events may be subject to change. Please check back for updates or contact [email protected] for more information.
Learn more about MCPS-sponsored lectures.
Upcoming Colloquium
Felipe De Brigard, February 13, 3:35 p.m.
Jay Aronson, February 20, 3:35 p.m.
In this talk I will share stories of individuals who have died in custody and chronicle the efforts of activists, journalists, and academic researchers to uncover the true scope and cause of deaths in custody over the past century. I will show that the roots of this work lie in Ida B. Wells's enumeration of extrajudicial lynchings in her 1895 pamphlet “The Red Record.”
Joseph November, February 27, 3:35 p.m.
Department of History, University of South Carolina
Kathryn Maxson Jones, March 20, 3:35 p.m.
History, Purdue University
Drawing on the published scientific literature and archival correspondence, Maxson Jones will discuss the little-known history of the HH model after 1952. Focusing on how this model became so central to the study of nerve cells and nervous systems between 1952 and 1977, she will explore several sets of experiments wherein biologists, including Hodgkin and Huxley, actively worked to test and expand the HH description from squid to other organisms. The talk will end with a discussion of the historical and historiographical implications, examining scientific and institutional developments associated with the rise of “neuroscience” from the 1950s to the 1970s. Overall, the talk will argue that marine creatures and coastal laboratories played integral roles in these developments.
Nedah N. Nemati, March 27, 3:35 p.m.
Center for Science and Society, Columbia University
Adding a new dimension to these methodological concerns, I argue that both philosophers and neuroscientists have overlooked the entanglement between the material conditions under which these tools are developed and the forms of opacity they produce. Drawing on qualitative, semi-structured interviews conducted through sustained engagement with software developers and various neuroscientific research groups, I reveal a crucial role for external demands – hardware constraints, user design, and funding priorities – in actively shaping how behavioral tracking algorithms are designed, built, and used. I discuss how seemingly peripheral conditions, such as material and institutional demands, exert conceptual pressure on what counts as “behavior,” constraining both experimental practice and the ontology of behavior itself.
Gregory Radick, April 3, 3:35 p.m.
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds
For over a century, what has been made salient to the beginning student in genetics are the binary traits which Gregor Mendel studied in his crossbred peas, the patterns of dominance and recessiveness that he discovered by tracking those binaries, and the atom-like entity – the gene – which, according to textbooks anyway, Mendel introduced in order to explain those patterns. Unquestionably, a curriculum that anchors students in elementary Mendelism can be highly successful on its own terms, step-by-step guiding students into genetic problem-solving as the gradual extension of Mendel’s reasoning to ever more complex cases. But it does so at the price of having students imprint on basic examples of inheritance in which – unlike the vast majority of inherited traits in the real world – nothing matters to explaining why they are as they are except the combination and recombination of genetic variants or “genotypes.” What is made salient in elementary Mendelism is, then, scientifically misleading. Many have long worried that it might be even worse than that, in that elementary Mendelism seems also to bring with it a determinism about genes that can shade into essentialism about people, related to an incuriosity about real-world variability and the multifactorial causation that brings it about.
Drawing on my recent book Disputed Inheritance: The Battle over Mendel and the Future of Biology (U. Chicago, 2023), I’ll describe how historical inquiry into the early twentieth-century debate over Mendel – and in particular, into the work of the leading critic of emerging Mendelism, W. F. R. Weldon (1860-1906) – opened up the historical possibility that genetics as a body of knowledge might have had an alternative, traits-are-modifiable-in-environments salience pattern. I’ll then look at how that historical possibility in turn prompted a counterfactual or “what-if?” question: what difference would it have made to genetics and society had genetic knowledge been organized not in line with Mendelian emphases but with Weldonian ones? I’ll also discuss my attempt to answer that counterfactual question by way of a novel classroom experiment, reflecting on the potential significance of the experiment for the history and philosophy of science, for genetics and its pedagogy, and for the disruption of salience traditions in science more widely.
Michael Reidy, April 10, 3:35 p.m.
History and Philosophy, Montana State University
S Wright Kennedy, April 17, 3:35 p.m.
Department of History, University of South Carolina
Roman Frigg, April 24, 3:35 p.m.
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics
Ronald Giere Memorial Lecture
Title: Cyclones, Forecasts, and Uncertainty: How Model-Ensembles Can Be an Effective Guide to Anticipatory Action
Abstract: Many important decisions are based on models offering detailed representations of physical systems. However, these models are often subject to uncertainty, which is reflected in the use of model ensembles in decision-making processes. We present a version of the confidence approach that uses model ensembles as input and show how this approach can be employed to build a confidence-sensitive decision support tool for anticipatory humanitarian action. We apply the tool to Cyclone Kenneth, which made landfall in Mozambique in April 2019. Comparing the level and timing of the alerts actually triggered with those recommended by the tool shows that a decision-maker would have acted earlier had they used the tool, considerably reducing the cyclone's impact.
Wendy Kline, May 1, 3:35 p.m.
Department of History, Purdue
Earlier Colloquium
Amy Riegelman, January 23, 3:35 p.m.
Matthew Hersch, January 30, 3:35 p.m.
Hilary Smith, February 6, 3:35 p.m.